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Knowledge and coordination between firms: The role of 
institutions and regional innovation systems1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The present paper is an early attempt of conceptualizing the existence and 
dynamics of regional innovation systems (RIS) in a perspective that, while 
focusing on cognitive issues, also draws inspiration from game theory and 
organizational economics. The paper is unabashedly speculative and strongly 
exploratory, but illustrates its basic ideas with an empirical case. 
 The RIS perspective, which will be summarized in section II, is a quite 
heterogeneous one.  However, it shares some basic arguments with the 
literatures on industrial clusters and industrial districts ¾ mainly that systemic 
relations between local organizations matter for social and economic 
development. In fact, these related literatures all portray systemic relations as 
the cornerstone of competitive advantage, because such relations allegedly 
facilitate the emergence, maintenance and development of strong external 
economies, for example, in the forms of flexible specialization and innovation in 
interaction between firms and their environments.  
 While some parts of the RIS literature are fairly practical and concentrate on 
empirically illustrating the impacts of regional service providers and 
universities on firm-level innovation rates, there is a growing RIS literature 
with an approach to the regional context of innovation processes that is more 
taken up with conceptual and theoretical development. Even if these scholars 
rarely use the term, we may say that they are preoccupied with describing the 
industrial structures and institutions that best facilitate the coordination of 
strategies and activities of multiple agents within regional systems of firms. 
Particular attention has been devoted to the problems of coordinating economic 
interactions between business entrepreneurs ¾ spanning from vertical supplier 
relations to horizontal strategic alliances or collective action. 
 The RIS literature is rich in interesting proposals, mainly based upon case 
studies. It has, however, been accused of a lack of clear theoretical concepts and 
of making empirically unsubstantiated claims (see, e.g., Casson 2000; Markusen 
1999). While some of these weaknesses must be ascribed to the relative young 
age of the RIS perspective, it is true that few RIS scholars have sought to 
provide theoretical accounts of, for example, the well-functioning market 
coordination that they claim to observe in regional agglomerations of firms. To 
us, it seems obvious that the RIS literature would benefit from incorporating 
more theoretical insight into issues of coordination, and the present paper is an 
early and speculative attempt of infusing some economics and game theory 
                                                                 
1 The authors acknowledge the LOK Research Center (Management, Organization, 
Competence) for financial support for this study. 
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ideas into the RIS literature. A natural source for such insights would be the 
economics or organization, that is, the well-established economics literature on 
the organization of economic activities across contracts and governance 
structures. However, the contemporary core of economics of organization ¾  
transaction cost theory, agency theory and incomplete contracts theory ¾  does 
not provide sufficient insights into all issues of coordination. This is why we 
also draw on communication theory, knowledge-based approaches to firms and 
markets, as well as some developments within game theory. 
 For quite some time, organizational economics scholars have devoted their 
attention to unpacking one particular category of coordination problems, 
namely problems of cooperation between agents that may arise as a consequence 
of asymmetric information and self-interested behavior. The RIS literature may 
benefit  ¾  and has already benefited to some extent ¾ from this theoretical 
insight in understanding how particular regional institutions facilitate 
cooperation amongst local entrepreneurs. However, the economic organization 
literature still pays relatively little attention to coordination problems that do 
not turn on misaligned interests, but rather on agents having incomplete, 
incorrect or different beliefs about each other or differing knowledge about 
particular tasks ¾ what we shall call cognitive coordination problems. We argue 
that the economics of organization has neglected cognitive coordination at its 
own peril, because cognitive coordination is crucial for interaction and 
innovation processes.  The two types of coordination problems and their 
solutions are clearly related; for example, cognitive coordination may imply 
that entrepreneurs form positive beliefs about each other which in turn lower 
transaction costs and facilitate trade and specialization. However, often it 
makes sense to consider cognitive problems and the solutions to these in 
isolation.  For example, in innovation processes, when cognitive coordination 
means that entrepreneurs share a language or “code book”, communication and 
knowledge sharing costs are lowered, possibly boosting the rate of interactive 
innovation. 
 The central argument of this paper is that not only does a RIS function as a 
structure of incentives that is defined by explicit and implicit contracts and by 
reputation and competitive mechanisms, it also facilitates cognitive coordination by 
defining specialized cognitive categories and by singling out certain solutions to 
coordination problems as dominant ones. We provide a theoretical account for what 
cognitive coordination is and how it may come about in a RIS. The paper is 
structured as follows. Section II presents the RIS perspective, and identifies the 
industrial activity areas in which a RIS benefits from market coordination. The 
section deals with horizontal and vertical relations between firms in turn. 
Section III then discusses the incentive-related and cognitive aspects of 
coordination, arguing that cognitive coordination achieved through shared 
knowledge of entrepreneurs is a central form of coordination within a RIS, and 
may allow for both communication and interaction with low transaction costs. 
Section IV addresses the processes of cognitive coordination, how shared 
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knowledge comes about. It describes how entrepreneurs may build knowledge 
jointly with partner firms, and how shared knowledge may also be a cognitive 
social institution, namely as a set of focal points that ease the process of 
interaction.  In section V, we argue that focal points often come about through 
analogy making, and that analogy making has both information costs and 
cognitive costs. This renders the amount of shared experiences of entrepreneurs 
and the density of social learning processes within a RIS central for its level of 
cognitive coordination. Finally, section VI presents an empirical example of 
how cognitive coordination may look like and how cognitive coordination may 
come about in a RIS, circumscribed by social learning processes. 
 
II. Regional Innovation Systems and Coordination 
 
Regional innovation systems 
The RIS perspective is developed in a growing heterogeneous literature of both 
a theoretical and an empirical nature. The perspective rests upon the heritage of 
thinkers such as Smith (1776), Marshall (1891) and Schumpeter (1934), and 
sometimes comes with an Austrian economics flavor (e.g. Hayek 1937). More 
explicitly, it draws upon recent literatures such as the national innovation 
system perspective (e.g. Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993); regional studies; and 
economic geography (e.g. Piore and Sabel 1984; Scott and Storper 1986). Much 
quoted RIS works are Asheim, (1997); Asheim and Cooke (1999); Braczyk et al 
(1998); De La Mothe and Paquet (1998), and Edquist (1997).  
 A RIS can, in its most basic form, be described as a relatively bounded and 
geographically proximate group of firms between which systemic relations 
facilitate firm-level innovation.  Some scholars (e.g. Edquist 1997) focus upon 
how a RIS may promote quite wide-ranging process and product innovations. 
Others emphasize that systemic firm relations in a RIS also facilitate variety and 
flexibility when firms (re-) combine their knowledge through flexible supplier 
arrangements and hence “avoid lock-in to a given technology” (Storper 1992: 
62).  RIS are often seen as particularly successful groups of firms (i.e., with 
above-average economic growth), even if this assumption is sometimes not 
made explicit, and is difficult to test empirically.2 In the description of a RIS, 
most scholars also include a range of local public or semi-public local 
organizations that support firm-level innovation. Indeed, some of the RIS 
literature is preoccupied with correlating regional innovation rates (for 
example, as measured by patent data) with regional infrastructures that are 
seen as particularly supportive for innovation ¾ notably, universities and other 
providers of research and knowledge-intensive services. A strand of literature 
that addresses innovation with more of an emphasis on theory development 
claims that local social institutions, such as social conventions and culture, are 
also central to the nature of a RIS.  
                                                                 
2  For example, evaluating whether a system of firms experiences “above average” economic growth implies 
difficult exercises of determining the system’s exact boundaries and finding relevant sectors and markets to 
which to compare it. 
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 With its focus upon systemic relations between firms, the RIS perspective is 
closely related to that of industrial clusters (e.g. Porter 1990; Schmitz 1999), 
albeit the cluster perspective has a less explicit focus upon innovation and 
geographical proximity. The RIS perspective also borrows from the literature on 
industrial districts within regional studies (e.g. Becattini 1990; Brusco 1992; 
Bianchi 1993). Some RIS that are particularly proximate and institutionally 
“thick” (Amin and Thrift 1994) can be compared to innovative industrial 
districts. Relatedly, scholars point to the importance of social capital ¾ (regional) 
configurations of social relations and social conventions ¾ that are particularly 
conductive to economic welfare (e.g. Burt 1992;  Maskell 2000).3   Some have 
argued that such institutional structures may be analyzed as rent-yielding 
resources that are shared in a group of interacting firms but may nevertheless 
be costly to imitate for firms that do not belong to the RIS (e.g., Foss and Eriksen 
1995; Maskell et al. 1998) 
 
Regional Innovation Systems Facilitate Coordination 
We accept the claim made in the RIS literature that it is possible to distinguish 
regional agglomerations of firms with systemic properties, i.e. carrying out 
(some) endemic innovative activities. Rather than going into the debate of 
whether firms in a RIS are more successful in innovation than other firms, the 
paper concentrates upon casting some light on the distinguishing features of a 
RIS. What is it that makes a RIS different to the “outside world”? Our central 
notion is that a RIS emerge to the extent that a group of agents establish ¾ 
intendedly and/or un-intendedly ¾ mechanisms of coordination that strongly 
reduce the various transaction costs involved in the process of coordinating the 
process of innovation between legally independent firms, and where these 
coordination mechanisms are specific to the set of geographically bounded 
agents.4  This means that RIS are able to rely on market mechanisms to a very 
large extent. Market coordination works in both the horizontal and the vertical 
dimensions. 
 
Horizontal coordination 
First, some RIS manifest particularly strong and well developed horizontal 
market coordination between firms that are specialized within similar 
activities.5 Horizontal specialization often leads to agglomeration economies, in 
the guise of a) specialization of local labor markets (specialization of local 
education bodies, attraction of skilled labor, and boosting skill levels within 
some fields through education and on-job training); and b) rich local 
infrastructures of supporting associations and specialized service providers 
(private firms, plus public service providers, such as research institutions and 
                                                                 
3  See Woolcock (1998) for a review of the social capital literature. 
4  An economist would argue that these mechanisms are “semi-public” or “club goods.” 
5  This often means more specialized than just in the same industrial sector. Further, some activities of firms may 
also cut across traditional sector boundaries. 
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universities). Even if some such agglomeration economies may arise 
spontaneously when many local firms carry out similar activities and demand 
similar services, the creation (and maintenance) of many supportive 
infrastructures demands local entrepreneurs to coordinate their actions 
(Schmitz 1999). For example, joint action of entrepreneurs is necessary to run 
local trade associations; change local course offers in education institutions; or 
influence local policymakers.  
 Another aspect of horizontal market coordination is technological spillovers. 
Technologies and designs have a propensity to spill over between firms that 
share basic technologies and training background of managers and employees, 
through monitoring and imitation or even active knowledge sharing (von 
Hippel 1988) or R&D collaborations (Foss and Eriksen 1995).  Some spillovers 
may simply accompany co-location of firms with related activities and 
technologies, for example, in the form of informal know-how trading (von 
Hippel 1988).  Formal knowledge sharing or R&D collaboration are ambiguous 
and risky activities that often involve substantial contractual hazards. Such 
activities pose particularly strong requirements for coordinating mechanisms 
and institutions. 
 
Vertical coordination 
Second, many RIS are also vertical systems of firm relations, i.e. value chains. A 
part of the capacity of a RIS is in fact to facilitate a continuously expanding 
specialization between firms, fostering learning and scale advantages within 
single firms. Vertical specialization and value chain relations may further boost 
user-producer innovation (Lundvall 1992). Value chains with flexible supplier 
relations ¾  i.e., flexible specialization ¾  also facilitate flexibility of the single 
firms and raises their product offer, but also demand that firms are able to 
quickly find new partners and collaborate with low transaction costs. This also 
necessitates coordinated behavior.  We consider this next. 
 
III. Coordination:  The Roles of Incentives and Beliefs 
 
It is a quite common theme in the literature that, somehow, RIS coordinate 
firms’ action, for example, by reducing uncertainty (e.g., Camagni 1991).  The 
exact mechanisms by which such coordination is accomplished are, however, 
seldom spelled out, although a few contributors have tried to establish 
typologies over these (e.g, Foss and Eriksen 1995; Lazaric  and Lorenz 1996; 
Foss and Lorenzen 2002).  We here distinguish between coordination problems 
that primarily relate to how to align the differing incentives of the parties and 
problems that relate to how to make agents choose strategies so that they 
implement a preferred equilibrium, irrespective of any incentive conflicts.  
 
Incentive Coordination 
First, reputational effects may work to align interests and behavior amongst 
local entrepreneurs. Regional systems of social rules and conventions ¾  for 
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example, on how to cooperate and share knowledge ¾  and social sanctions 
against those who breach these conventions can be a very efficient way to avoid 
opportunistic behavior within the relatively bounded group of local 
entrepreneurs who depend upon each other’s future collaboration.  These 
mechanisms are likely to work smoothly in RIS, precisely because of the 
geographical bounds on the group of interacting agents.   Another regional 
mechanism that can align the interests and behavior of local entrepreneurs is 
the existence ¾  at least in some RIS ¾  of local facilitators, professional 
mediators or organizations that specialize in coordinating new partnerships 
between entrepreneurs.  Such coordinated activity facilitates business that 
would otherwise under uncertainty be risky or expensive in terms of 
transaction costs ¾ for example, inter-firm collaboration with high sunk costs, 
or knowledge sharing with potential competitors.  
 However, Foss and Lorenzen (2002) point to the somewhat neglected, but 
nevertheless obvious point that the coordination of behaviors does not always 
hinge upon providing the right incentives. In fact, it is usually in the interests of 
regularly interacting firms to cooperate and refrain from opportunistic behavior 
(as noted already by Macaulay 1963); their relations are governed by implicit, 
self-enforcing contracts.  Such implicit contracts may be generalized so that a 
RIS is governed by an overarching implicit and opportunism-reducing contract.   
However, even if such implicit contracts exist, there may still be other kinds of 
coordination problems left.   In game theory terms, the kind of incentive related 
coordination problems that we have just briefly discussed are often called 
“cooperation problems”.  The kind of coordination problems that do not turn 
on misaligned incentives are usually simply called “coordination problems” (of 
“pure” or “impure” varieties).   We consider these next.   
 
Cognitive coordination 
Lazaric and Lorenz (1996) point toward a second mechanism that reduces 
uncertainty in a RIS and coordinates behavior, namely that firms may control 
shared knowledge. A shared technological language can allow for “transcoding” 
(Camagni 1991) between firms, i.e. make them understand each other’s 
technologies, methods, etc. Another type of shared knowledge may be 
entrepreneurs’ common strategies of how to behave and collaborate. This 
shared knowledge align their behavior ¾  as well as expectations as to their 
partner’s strategies and behavior. This type of shared knowledge thus has a 
large potential for facilitating cooperation.  
 When shared knowledge, which may result in convergent expectations 
(plans, strategies), facilitate the coordination of behaviors, we may talk about 
cognitive coordination (Foss and Lorenzen, forthcoming 2002). Cognitive 
coordination may also take place within a particular organization. For example, 
rules and routines ¾  i.e. shared knowledge ¾ are typically developed within 
firms and corporations. Indeed, according to some writers (e.g., Kogut and 
Zander 1993), this is what distinguish them from markets, in terms of 
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coordinating communication and behavior of agents (who, in this case, are 
employees). The argument is, simply put, that employees of a firm will 
understand each other better and trust each other more than agents in the 
market. Much critique has been raised against this argument, pointing both 
towards the fact that there may be considerable coordination as well as 
cooperation problems within firms, and towards the high level of shared 
knowledge and coordination taking place in some markets, i.e. between firms.  
 We agree with this critique, because we argue that cognitive coordination is 
empirically a central ingredient of a RIS and that such cognitive coordination 
rests upon a basis of shared knowledge that serve as focal points for the 
coordination of actions (Foss and Eriksen 1995). Here, shared knowledge and 
cognitive coordination has two main impacts upon innovation. First, shared 
strategies can make entrepreneurs cooperate. Second, shared code books can 
make them understand each other, and hence benefit from the information they 
get through their cooperation.  Although much of the relevant literature has 
been alert to the importance of such shared knowledge, little attention has been 
devoted to the processes that result in this knowledge.  
 
IV. Processes of Cognitive Coordination 
 
If shared knowledge provides cognitive coordination, how does shared 
knowledge come about? What is the character of such processes of institutional 
development?  And, once created, how exactly does shared knowledge effect 
cognitive coordination?  
 
Shared knowledge through collaboration 
Two firms may come to share knowledge through their direct relations to each 
other. For example, in the course of a collaboration, they may learn about each 
other’s processes, and become better in understanding each other’s 
technologies. Thus, they may develop what Loasby (1998) calls “indirect 
capabilities.” This may form the basis for adopting the partner’s technologies.  
Further, they may learn about each other’s interests and strategies, and align 
these over time (Håkansson 1989), gradually creating partner-specific trust.6 
However, building shared knowledge through relations between firms is a 
process that is costly in terms of both time and effort. This is why some 
entrepreneurs choose to rely on trust that has already been formed outside the 
business sphere, hence limiting much collaboration to networks of families, 
friends, or friends’ friends. 
 
                                                                 
6  Note that when we speak of trust here and in the following, we do not refer to the kind of trust that exists to 
reduce problems of opportunism. Rather, the trust considered relates to believing that another person meets a 
certain level of competence with respect to his contribution to joint activities or the services that he is carrying 
out for a principal.  
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Focal points 
Shared knowledge may, however, also derive from the broader social context in 
which entrepreneurs find themselves. Different firms may be able to 
communicate about some technical issues when their staff share formal 
educational background, for example, they are engineers.  In a RIS perspective, 
provision of such shared code books for coordination between local firms is one 
important effect of regional educational institutions, like universities. However, 
many issues, even of technical nature, have a large content of tacit knowledge, 
and their communication between firms demands a shared practical know-how 
rather than similar formal education. A RIS constitutes a regional production 
system where firms are specialized within similar industrial activities, meaning 
that local firms may have a range of similar practical experiences. Further, as 
firms are connected in complex and shifting local production networks ¾ and 
are able to monitor each other ¾ social processes of learning (Bandura 1977) 
raise their general level of shared experiences and common knowledge about 
core technologies. All this means that firms within a RIS are often able to 
understand each other’s technologies to higher degrees than outsider firms. 
 In a RIS, social learning processes may also result in common strategies 
amongst local entrepreneurs, what Schelling (1960) refers to as focal points. Focal 
points can function as code books or as common strategies to apply when 
interacting. Focal points that are shared by a large group of entrepreneurs can 
thus align their general behavior and expectations, stimulating social trust (i.e. 
trust that is not partner-specific, but mutual between all members of a 
particular group). Social trust thus hinges upon cognitive coordination, as 
managers have aligned positive expectations about each other  and ascribe 
trustworthiness to each other on the grounds of membership of the group as a 
supplement to (or in some cases as a substitute for) personal knowledge of each 
other. 
 In the following, we further aim to unpack the social learning processes that 
result in cognitive coordination. The argument we make can be applied to 
cognitive coordination processes in general, but is applied here to a RIS to 
explain why particularly dense patterns of shared knowledge and relatively 
high levels of cognitive coordination may evolve in such regional contexts. 
 
V. Social Learning and Analogy Making  
 
Social learning and geographical proximity 
A strategy becomes routinized when an agent experiments and re-applies the 
strategy that is relatively efficient. However, in a RIS, all agents need not rely on 
their own personal experience with a full specter of strategies, rather, the 
learning processes of most of them consist of imitation of neighbors rather than 
experimentation: They imitate the observed successful strategies applied by 
others. Through social learning, common focal points becomes institutionalized 
as “meta-routines” in a RIS, hence allowing the population of local 
entrepreneurs to coordinate their expectations (Bandura 1977). Social learning 
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processes work smoothly between entrepreneurs in a RIS compared to the 
outside world, because of an abundance of strong and weak ties (Granovetter 
1973), facilitated by the geographical proximity of local entrepreneurs. 
Proximity promotes face-to-face interactions along with monitoring and gossip, 
and hence shared experiences and points of reference. A geographically 
proximate production system that experiences growing economic activity, 
specialization and inter-firm cooperation, also increases its number of inter-firm 
interactions, and hence the prevalence of shared focal points within a RIS may 
grow over time.  
 
Focal points as analogy making 
But what determines which focal points will evolve in a RIS? We shall argue 
that analogies to earlier interaction situations are particularly important here.7  
In our argument, a focal point ¾ i.e., a shared strategy ¾ arises when a whole 
group of agents make similar analogies. For example, the shared strategies and 
expectations that leads to social trust can be seen as constituting similar analogy 
making by a group of entrepreneurs: They all ascribe trustworthiness to each 
other on the ground that they belong to a particular social group (they are 
locals). This is the same type of analogy as a patient makes when he trusts a 
doctor, not because he knows him as a person, but because he ascribes 
trustworthiness to doctors in general. 
 There seems to be some focal analogies that are almost ubiquitous.  Some 
basic logical or practical problems, some of which may date back to the dawn of 
human evolution, seem to have been solved the same way throughout human 
history, giving rise to focal points common to most human agents, as they make 
analogy to the same precedent solutions. For example, the ubiquitous principle 
of equal division may be a strategy that dates back to a very basic problem of 
division of sums  (as Hayek 1973 speculates).  Some other situations have given 
rise to a few, competing, strategies. For example, given the problem ”pick a 
number”, primes, or the first number in a sequence, or the only even number, 
etc. are likely to be focal points evolved in coordination situations long ago. But 
focal points like even numbers are not universal. Some basic coordination 
situations have been solved by different strategies in different groups of agents. 
These are much more narrowly defined situations where a relatively small 
group of agents develop a strategy, which may later be used for coordination 
purposes by analogy. The focal points are much more specific and with more 
limited applicability. We shall argue that a RIS constitutes a good example of 
such situations, because it comprises a limited and often fairly stable number of 
agents, facing a limited range of specialized and related tasks.  
 In an interaction situation, an agent is placed in a strategic situation and is 
therefore concerned about what the other agents will do.  In some cases he will 
                                                                 
7  There is evidence from experimental game theory for this.  In this body of literature analogy is discussed under 
the heading of precedent formation and utilization in repeated games, that is, how past equilibrium experiences 
may transfer across games (e.g. Knez 1998). 
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try to figure out what analogies other agents may resort to. Thus, there is a 
higher-level coordination problem of choosing the same analogy (cf. Sugden 
1989: 94).  What, then, determines which analogy is chosen? And how can we 
explain that in a RIS, the same analogies are chosen by all (or most) local agents, 
resulting in dominating focal points that may be very different from those of 
agents outside the RIS?  Our central propositions concerning this problem is 
that making analogies has both cognitive and information costs, and that single 
agents in a RIS balance these with the benefits of strategies in determining the 
focal points that will win out, and that this balancing takes place through social 
learning within the RIS. 
 
Cognitive costs of analogy making 
First, we suggest that the focal points that evolve within RIS are limited by the 
cognitive costs of making analogies.  Cognitive costs are the resource costs of 
not being able to efficiently process (digest, store, retrieve, synthesize, 
memorize....) information.  It is different from search costs, which are the 
resource costs of acquiring certain pieces of information.  Even if a range of 
information is available to a given agent, he will make sense of only a 
subcategory of this, depending upon what he “scans” for and depending upon 
his prior knowledge. How much he benefits from the information that he has 
obtained further depends upon his capacity to process it (i.e. to combine it with 
his previously obtained information and preexisting knowledge). In short, even 
with an abundance of information, little is obtained, and even less leads to 
learning, if it is very different from the information and knowledge we already 
posses.8 There is quite some ambiguity in the literature concerning what 
cognitive structures consist of ¾ mental capacities, language skills, etc. ¾ and 
whether they can be different between agents, can change over time, and so on.  
 However, some cognitive structures are most likely dependent upon the 
physiology of the human brain (Hayek 1952) and equally apply to everybody. 
In other words, some cognitive costs are ubiquitous. Concerning analogy 
making in a RIS, the similarities and differences (i.e., the degree of 
isomorphism) between earlier situations and the present determine the size of 
the cognitive costs of making an analogy. This argument is inspired by 
Weitzenfeld’s (1984) enlightening discussion of reasoning by analogy. While 
aimed at understanding the limits of the use reasoning by analogy in scientific 
discourse, there is no reason why its insights should not be transferable (by 
analogy!) to players engaged in more mundane interaction. Weitzenfeld makes 
a distinction between “homeomorphs” (i.e., analogues of the same kind) and 
“paramorphs” (i.e., analogues of different kinds). He points out that valid 
reasoning by analogy requires that “… [f]or an inference from some known 
properties of a particular to other properties, there must be some determining 
relations between the properties.  That is, the properties must be values of 
                                                                 
8  Cohen and Levintahl (1990) suggest that organizations also have “absorptive capacities”¾  internal structures 
that determine what they can do with the information that they have access to. 
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variables bound by a non-accidental relation.  This set of non-accidental 
relations I call the determining structure of the particular” (Weitzenfeld 1984 p. 
142-3).   It is isomorphism of determining structures that validates the use of 
analogy. Thus, we may suggest that when agents in RIS make analogies across 
interaction situations, players rely on reasoning which involve comparisons of 
determining structures, for example, comparisons between what they believe 
are the forms of the relevant situations. Because it is incurs fewer cognitive costs 
to make an analogy between homeomorphs than between paramorphs, the 
former may be a more prominent source of focal points than the latter. 
 
Information costs of analogy making 
It is likely that strategies resting upon paramorph analogies can only become 
focal points if they are circumscribed with advantages that offset their relatively 
higher cognitive costs. We propose that such advantages may be low 
information costs. If it is particularly easy to obtain the information needed to 
apply a strategy ¾  for example, through information services or through 
gossip within a RIS  ¾, it may be repeatedly chosen by agents, even if the 
analogy making associated with it is relatively taxing. Whereas cognitive costs 
are determined by the abilities of the agents who make an analogy, information 
costs are determined by the nature of the RIS as a whole ¾ in particular, how 
agents are connected in social networks that enable them to obtain information. 
 In conclusion, this section has suggested that when focal points are formed, it 
happens through experimentation and imitation, and that agents are likely to 
experiment with those strategies that incur the lowest cognitive and 
information costs first. Agents can experiment with applying a strategy that has 
been applied in earlier situations ¾ if such situations were similar to the 
present, the analogy is easily made. If the re-application of this strategy proves 
efficient, it is consistently applied. If not, for example because it proves costly in 
terms of money, time, or information, agents may experiment with analogies 
which incurs higher cognitive costs, but may also yield higher pay-offs.  
 
VI. An Empirical Example9 
 
As a way of illustrating the propositions put forward above, we now turn to an 
empirical example. By means of the notions of cognitive coordination, focal 
points, and analogy making, we shall try to explain the growth of one of the 
successful furniture producing and exporting districts of the world: The Danish 
Salling district. It should be noted that what follows is in no way an empirical 
test of the validity of our propositions.  Such a test is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, withstanding the limitations of the case study method, the 
practical application of our propositions to the Salling case has indeed proved 
useful, and hence lends them some merit. 
 
                                                                 
9  This section builds on Foss and Lorenzen  (forthcoming 2002). 
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Coordination tasks in the furniture industry 
The European furniture industry mainly consists of SMEs, due both to 
production technology and the predominance of traditional management styles. 
Recent globalization of competition has led to only modest restructuring and 
consolidation of the industry. Because of the volatility of consumer markets and 
growing demands for product varieties and innovations, there is an increasing 
pressure on furniture producers to specialize and outsource further. Most 
networks of specialized firms consist of independent firms, and there seems to 
be little scope for joint ownership or other types of formalized governance. This 
form of industrial organization implies particular tasks of coordination. 
 First, there is a category of tasks related to bargaining. The diversity of 
customer demands necessitates many specialized furniture producers to 
shifting between particular suppliers, while maintaining a core of dedicated 
suppliers. After firms have obtained information on which suppliers have the 
right qualifications and capacity at the appropriate time, and judged with 
whom to enter into relations, they still face the task of agreeing with their 
supplier upon price and quality levels.  Second, there is a category of tasks 
related to governance. In order to cooperate, managers need to align expectations 
with respect to a host of variables, many of which are not (perhaps cannot be) 
described in contracts.  However, furniture production systems consist of 
specialized independent manufacturers. In such systems, there may be larger 
scope for opportunism and malfeasance between buyers and suppliers than if 
all the production units were under the same ownership.  Unfortunately, within 
the furniture industry, contract writing is often inhibited by high costs (both in 
terms of transaction costs and loss of the flexibility and speed of delivery, which 
is so important on furniture markets). 
 
Coordination problems and solutions in the furniture industry 
There is a host of incentive-related and cognitive aspects to these bargaining 
and governance tasks.  Concerning bargaining, the solution may be to rely upon 
standards. However, great incentive conflicts between firms (and other 
stakeholders in the industry) may surface when a standard is to be set. In our 
terminology, there is a potential incentive-related coordination problem here, 
which may be found within the furniture industry. In the furniture industry, 
many local standards also evolve organically rather than being set by a central 
body. However, how standards evolve is not a trivial problem. A manager may 
face a problem of choosing the same standard as his potential partner. 
  Concerning governance, what drives down its costs in some of the most 
successful furniture producing regions of Europe (notably, the Italian or Danish 
industrial districts), is only rarely incentive alignment through contractual 
means (or if too costly, through ownership). Rather, it would be more correct to 
say that managers’ expectations are aligned through common focal points like 
social conventions.  In turn, this cognitive coordination allows for the smooth 
operation of reputational effects and contracting which also characterize these 
regions. In other words, the governance mode of furniture managers within 
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many successful regions is social trust. Arguably, in the furniture industry, 
incentive alignment through contactual arrangements and reputational effects 
as a means to lowering transaction costs cannot take place without some level 
of social trust ¾ because we cannot expect managers to commit themselves to 
sinking costs into their cooperative arrangements without some initial (aligned) 
expectations that they will not waste their investments (Lorenzen 1998).  
 
Regional competitiveness of the Danish Salling district 
Maskell et al. (1998) and Lorenzen (1998; 1999) argue that institutional 
endowments of regions determine their specialization and export success with 
regards to furniture manufacturing.  Conversely, Kautonen (1998) has 
explained the decline of furniture production in the Finnish Lathi region by 
means of its low level of social trust, and Kjær (1998) makes a similar argument 
concerning the Swedish furniture industry. Arguably, what determines success 
within the furniture industry is the ability of managers to solve coordination 
tasks, and predominantly those related to cognition.  
 In the following, we shall outline the case of the Danish Salling furniture 
district. Located around the Salling peninsular and Skive town in West Jutland, 
the district encompasses a profound and growing agglomeration of specialized 
economic activity in Danish terms.10 Here, flexibly specialized small and 
medium-sized furniture firms dominate, reaping external scope, scale, and 
learning economies. Managers of furniture producers efficiently solve 
bargaining and governance tasks related to maintaining cooperative relations, 
and we shall exemplify how this is done on the basis of efficient cognitive 
coordination. We will also account for how cognitive coordination has evolved 
within the district. 
 The data presented was obtained in the period 1993-1998, through 27 semi-
structured interviews in firms and other local organizations (such as the local 
producers’ guild; the technical school; the union; a bank; a credit association; 
and the local industrial development agency). The mechanisms underlying the 
coordination patterns demonstrated through these interviews were then 
investigated through in-depth studies of three selected firms.11 
                                                                 
10  In 1996, the seven municipalities of the Salling district comprised more than 54 furniture producers and at least 
2388 employees within this industry. Furniture production made up 33% of manufacture, and 28% of 
manufacturing employment. The export rate of the firms within the Salling district is higher than the high 
Danish average of 80%, and success stories have been frequent of Salling firms exploring new markets, 
branding products, and developing new designs. That the Salling district has in this way taken the lead when it 
comes to Danish furniture exports has not only meant growth of some existing producers ¾ it has also 
encompassed numerous start-ups of new small firms. Today, in spite of some firms that have grown to a 
considerable size, the average size of Salling furniture firms is still small. The small size of most firms seems 
not to hinder their economic development ¾ based on their organizing still new networks aiming at 
subcontracting, exports, brands, or designs. Thus, apart from a few large firms, the growth of furniture 
production in the Salling district is accounted for by a particular group of firms (roughly, two thirds of the total 
number of local firms), with a large ability to cooperate. This section shall focus upon this core group 
(“Salling” will from now on refer to members of this group). 
11  The in-depth studies consisted of repeated semi-structured interviews, where findings were also validated, plus 
performing on-site observations of the activities of the manager-owners of the firms during the same week in 
the fall of 1997 (time studies). This method for the in-depth studies allowed combining accounts for time 
expenditures, routines, external contacts, and information exchanges within the studied firms and between them 
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Bargaining by analogy in the Salling district 
A first example concerns Salling managers’ solutions to bargaining problems. 
The tasks of aligning their interdependencies and designing flexible 
cooperation practices are solved through relying upon non-formalized and oral 
standards for prices, delivery quality, and delivery times.  
 Where do the focal points encapsulated in these standards come from? Price and 
quality levels are set as a part of negotiating processes between single suppliers 
and buyers. Because producers spread information in order to make their 
suppliers perform better, and suppliers often share price and quality 
information, collective standards quickly arise, as all suppliers have to make an 
effort to perform so well that their customers do not switch to other suppliers 
for price or quality reasons. Standards are regularly adjusted, and hence, cannot 
be considered as very stable focal points in themselves. However, the principle 
of utilizing standards is quite stable. Even if bargaining problems vary ¾ since, 
for example, prices need adjustments more often than qualities ¾ managers 
label and solve most bargaining situations the same way, making analogy to 
how earlier situations were solved.  
 Why is this analogy made, and why has the strategy of utilizing standards become a 
dominating principle? Clearly, utilizing the standards is an efficient and 
inexpensive means of solving a coordination task, and because managers 
exchange information and advice to a very high degree, they have taught each 
other to use them. Furthermore, as more and more suppliers are forced to 
comply to standards, and as more and more buyers rely on standards, the value 
as a focal point of this strategy continues to increase. 
 The twin cognitive problems of arriving at appropriate standards, plus 
choosing to use standards at all, are thus solved by social learning processes, 
circumscribed by the economic efficiency of using standards; the low 
information costs (ease of access) of standards; and social pressure towards 
complying to standards. 
 
Governance by analogy in the Salling district 
Even more illustrative for our purpose is to observe how Salling managers’ 
carry out the coordination tasks of governance. Roughly speaking, they find 
themselves in four different categories of interaction situations: 
· Downstream situations with agents or retailers (only faced by end 
producers).  
· Upstream situations with non-specialized suppliers. 
· Upstream situations with specialized suppliers. 
· Horizontal situations. 
In the first two categories of interaction situations, producers govern through 
contracts, as both retail chains and non-specialized suppliers demand this. 
However, the two next categories of interaction situations are excellent 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
and their partner firms with qualitative data on issues such as trust, communication, and cognition. 
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examples of cognitive coordination. Interviewed Salling managers claim that 
they are not very keen on the formalities necessitated by writing contracts with 
agents, retailers, and non-specialized suppliers (mostly, none of these are not 
from the Salling district). In essence, in the vertical and horizontal interaction 
situations with local specialized suppliers, they rely on ascriptive trust rather 
than contracts. The typical Salling managers expect each other to refrain from 
opportunism, even when no types of non-contractual safeguards (such as 
credible commitments) are present.  
 Where does the basis for ascribing trust come from? The typical criteria for 
ascribing trust to another manager is that he follows a particular set of common 
local social norms (in essence, he should be a manager-owner, a quality-
conscious rather than price-focused craftsman, and a local patriot) ¾ plus, 
importantly, that he is a local. In particular, the local producers’ guild 
constitutes an efficient social group, where reputational effects prevent 
opportunism and reinforces social trust. The efficiency of the strategy of 
ascribing trust, the low costs of the information needed for ascribing trust 
according the above criteria (i.e., gossip), plus the social learning effects within 
the producers guild are the reasons that this strategy has become so dominant. 
In fact, managers use this strategy in both vertical and horizontal interactions, 
even if they are very different in terms of products, standards, and so on. In 
spite of these differences, Salling managers label vertical and horizontal 
interactions between locals the same way, and re-apply strategies to new 
situations, i.e. expect each other to base each new deal on ascriptive trust, and 
to use the above criteria for trustworthiness. Most of the vertical (supplier) 
relationships in Salling are of much older date than horizontal networks. Thus, 
in the latter, analogy is made to the former in order to arrive at a governance 
strategy. 
  Why is this analogy made, and why has the strategy of relying upon ascriptive trust 
become a dominating principle? Interviews suggest that the governance strategy 
which is predominant in economic networks amongst the Salling managers has 
in fact emerged through analogy to informal interaction situations that have for 
long taken place in social networks amongst the managers. Ascribing trust on 
the account of the common social norms has for more than a decade been a 
strategy applied when meeting and making activities in the producers’ guild. In 
this forum, the strategy predates most of the economic networks between local 
firms. Up to the 1980s, there were few economic networks between Salling 
firms, and they were based on painstaking and slow trust-building processes 
and placement of credible commitments. With the expansion of the German 
market in the 1980s, the boom in the number of Danish furniture producers, 
and a larger technological scope for (and market pull towards) specialization 
and outsourcing, Salling managers increasingly began to “demand” trust. As a 
quicker means of achieving it, they begun to rely on third-party advice, as 
colleagues within the producers’ guild shared their positive experiences with 
other trustworthy members of the producers’ guild. A particular group of 
managers among whom recommendations were frequent and reputational 
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effects high emerged as a consequence. Most of the managers within this group 
have now, in need for a means of quickly and cheaply finding and trusting new 
partners for (short or long term) cooperative arrangements, developed a routine 
of searching for the partner within their own ranks, and trusting this partner, 
unless the trust placed in him is abused (which it, in part due to reputational 
effects, usually is not). Through social learning, step-by-step trust-building 
processes taking place in each individual network have become superseded by 
a common (social) ascriptive trust. The market efficiency of ascriptive trust (it 
allows firms to quickly, inexpensively, and flexibly coordinate and thus 
specialize and cooperate) means that more and more local producers are willing 
to experiment with it. Its value as a focal point hence increases in a self-
reinforcing learning process. 
  
 
VII. Concluding remarks 
 
The discussion in this paper is highly speculative and roams widely.  The 
central proposition is that cognitive coordination plays a pivotal role for trust-
based cooperation and communication amongst entrepreneurs in a RIS. By 
arguing that agents to a very large extent may rely on analogy to earlier 
interaction situations in coordinating their actions, and that dense social 
networks facilitated by geographical proximity within a RIS function as a frame 
for analogy making, we have proposed an explanation for how and why 
cognitive coordination may be particularly efficient within RIS. We proposed 
that analogies that come up with solutions that are inefficient in the long or 
short term are most likely to be discarded.  Further, cognitive costs rising from 
lack of ideomorphism between two interaction situations might impede 
analogy making. The success of coordination through analogy depends on the 
extent to which the relevant analogies are homomorphs or paramorphs.  The 
more in the direction of paramorphs, the harder it will be for players to 
coordinate their analogies, and therefore their actions. Finally, we suggested 
that social learning is central for how interaction situations may “feed” into 
each other.  
 We applied our propositions about cognitive coordination and analogy 
making to the case of the Salling district and argued that our perspective could 
cast considerable light over the organization and development of this district. 
We demonstrated how Salling managers who solve both problems of price 
bargaining and of quality bargaining by referring to collective standards, make 
homeomorph analogies. Because the price and quality bargaining situations 
have same variables (managers), relations between variables (subcontracting 
arrangements), and determining structure (e.g. risks and pay-offs), the analogy 
is cognitively inexpensive to make. The case however also gave evidence of 
linkage of dis-similar situations, namely managers that use a strategy for 
finding and trusting a partner by a paramorph analogy to how social life is 
conducted within the local producers’ guild.  This analogy is considerably more 
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cognitively taxing. That a strategy resting upon a paramorph analogy ¾ thus 
implying higher cognitive costs ¾ could become a focal point solving 
governance problems amongst Salling managers can be explained by the high 
market efficiency of the strategy itself. Ascriptive trust facilitates flexible 
specialization and has helped Salling furniture firms in gaining considerable 
export shares. Furthermore, the strategy is supported by extremely low 
information costs, as the information needed in order to ascribe trust is readily 
available to the managers as gossip in the local producers’ guild. This 
observation on low information costs also applies to the strategy of relying on 
price and quality standards: It is easy for local suppliers to achieve information 
about the prices and qualities of other local suppliers as this is shared between 
managers. 
 We suggested that with time, cognitive coordination may become more 
efficient within a RIS, because focal points become more widely disseminated 
through social learning, and the emergence of new networks. As cognitive 
coordination in turn facilitates network building, the process of cognitive 
coordination may become self-reinforcing. That history matters so much for a 
RIS may explain why it is so extremely difficult to imitate the functions of a RIS 
elsewhere, or to create a RIS by design. However, the path dependence of RIS 
and the cumulative causation that may take place can also lead to lock-in and 
inefficiency. If world markets shift, or the structure of RIS in other respects 
become inefficient, the dominance of particular focal points and hence 
particular ways of doing things can be a regional liability in stead of an asset, as 
it prevents change. While strong focal points may facilitate technological 
innovation through facilitating firm interactions, they may prevent larger scale 
changes. The paper has not sought to deal with this question, nor the questions 
of why and how lock-in situations have been avoided by some RIS and not by 
others. The paper has only represented a first stab at accounting for 
coordination within RIS. Clearly, there is room for more substantial theoretical 
work here, as well for empirical testing. The Salling case was applied for the 
sake of illustration rather than testing. 
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